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a b s t r a c t
Complementary symmetry was derived before under particular theories, and used to test those.
Progressively general results were published. This paper proves the condition in full generality,
providing a one-line proof, and shedding new light on its empirical implications.
© 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Birnbaum, Yeary, Luce, and Zhao (2016) introduced a com-
plementary symmetry preference condition for binary monetary
prospects. Their Theorem 1 showed that it holds for the version of
prospect theory of Schmidt, Starmer, and Sugden (2008), consid-
ered before by Birnbaum and Zimmermann (1998), under some
popular parametric assumptions. Those included power utility
with the same power for gains and losses. Before, Birnbaum
and Zimmermann (1998, Eq. 22) had obtained that result un-
der prospect theory for fifty-fifty binary prospects. Lewandowski
(2018) extended the result to any strictly increasing continuous
utility function u with u(0) = 0, both for regular prospect
theory and for the theory of Birnbaum and Zimmermann (1998)
and Schmidt et al. (2008). Finally, Chudziak (2020) extended
the result to any preference functional that gives unique buy-
ing and selling prices. Birnbaum (2018) discussed the empiri-
cal performance of complementary symmetry, in particular its
violations.
All aforementioned results concerned the domain of all binary
prospects and assumed a preference functional, implying weak
ordering, on that domain. We generalize the result to any binary
relation on any subset of binary prospects. Our proof takes only
one line.
Let xpy denote a prospect yielding outcome x with probability
0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and outcome y with probability 1-p. Outcomes are
real-valued, designating money. The prospect 010 is identified
with the outcome 0. By ∼ we denote a binary relation on binary
prospects. The aforementioned papers assumed that ∼ is the
indifference part of a transitive complete preference relation, but
we will not impose any restriction on ∼.
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B is a buying price of xpy if
0 ∼ (x − B)p(y − B). (1)
S is a selling price of x1−py (= ypx), or a complementary selling price
of xpy, if
0 ∼ (S − y)p(S − x). (2)
These definitions are the most common ones. Several alternative
definitions have been considered (Bateman, Kahneman, Munro,
Starmer, & Sugden, 2005, §3; Lewandowski, 2018, appendix). The
above definitions are the ones used by Birnbaum et al. (2016)
in their definition of complementary symmetry (given below). In
economics, the terms willingness to pay and willingness to accept
are often used instead of buying and selling prices.
Substituting S = x + y - B, Eqs. (1) and (2) are identical:
[B = buying price of xpy]
⇔ [S = x + y − B is complementary selling price of xpy]. (3)
Eq. (3) is called complementary symmetry for xpy, and provides
a one-line proof (in the layout of my working paper ...) of the
following theorem, generalizing the results cited above.
Theorem 1. 1 For each xpy, complementary symmetry holds. Hence,
a buying price B exists if and only if a complementary selling price
S exists. B is unique if and only if S is unique. If B is unique, then
S = x + y - B. □
1 Further, under existence and uniqueness: if one of the three [0 ∼ (x −
B)p(y − B)], [0 ∼ (S − y)p(S − x)], and [B + S = x + y] holds, then the other two
are equivalent (Chudziak, 2020, Theorem 2.2).
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Because we consider complementary symmetry only for one
xpy, our result can be applied to any subset of binary prospects.
Our main contribution is the simplified proof. An empirical im-
plication is that the violations of complementary symmetry, sur-
veyed by Birnbaum (2018), concern more fundamental problems
than thought before.
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